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Sonntag, 10. März 2013

hier gehts Grenada pari passu mässig an den Kragen....


hier gehts Grenada pari passu mässig an den Kragen....


hier gehts Grenada pari passu mässig an den Kragen....


PLAINTIFF(S) ADDRESS(ES) AND COUNTY(IES)
The Export-Import Bank of the Republic of China
3 Nanhai Road, 8th Floor
Taipei (100) Taiwan
Republic of China

DEFENDANT(S) ADDRESS(ES) AND COUNTY(IES)
Grenada
Ministry of Finance
Financial Complex
Carenage, St. George's, Grenada


Paul E. Summit
Andrew T. Solomon
SULLIVAN & WORCESTER LLP
1633 Broadway
New York, NY 10019
(212)660-3000
Attorneys fo r Plaintiff/Judgment Creditor

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
THE EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF
THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA,
-X
Plaintiff/Judgment Creditor,
-against-
GRENADA,
Defendant/Judgment Debtor.
-X
i l
Civil Action No:
COMPLAINT
Ca í
•'C
I
Plaintiff The Export-Import Bank of the Republic of China (“Ex-Im Bank”), by its-*7"

attorneys, Sullivan & Worcester LLP, complains of the defendant Grenada as follows^
• ••

JURISDICTION AND VENUE o '

I. This court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action pursuant to 28
U.S.C.§ 1330.

2. Venue properly exists in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(f), based upon
the residence and status o f the parties, the events and omissions giving rise to the claims, and the
agreement which provides the basis for this action.

3. In addition, Grenada irrevocably consented to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of
any State or Federal Court in New York, New York, to waive any objection to that venue on any
ground, and to accept service o f process by registered or certified mail to the notice address
provided in the agreements at issue.

THE PARTIES

4. Ex-Im Bank is a banking institution organized and existing under the laws of the
Republic of China, with its principal place o f business in Taipei, the Republic of China. The
business of Ex-Im Bank includes the lending of money internationally.

5. Grenada is a foreign state as defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a).

BACKGROUND

6. Between 1990 and 2000, Ex-Im Bank and Grenada executed four loan agreements
by which Grenada borrowed a total o f $28,000,000 from Ex-Im Bank (the “Loan Agreements”).

7. On March 16, 2007, in an earlier action between the parties, Civil Action No. 06-
CV-2469(HB)(AJP), this Court entered an amended judgment in favor o f Ex-Im Bank and
against Grenada in the amount o f $21,586,057.38, plus pre-judgment interest, attorney’s fees and
statutory interest in connection with Grenada’s default on four multi-million dollar promissory
notes executed by Grenada in favor o f Ex-Im Bank pursuant to the Loan Agreements.

8. With post-judgment interest, Ex-Im Bank’s judgment against Grenada now stands
in excess of $32,000,000.

9. Almost six years later, Grenada has still not paid anything to Ex-Im Bank in
satisfaction o f the judgment.

10. Section 4.04 o f the Loan Agreement o f April 24, 1997 states, “Borrower’s
obligations under this Agreement and the Note will at all times rank at least pari passu with
Borrower’s any other External Indebtedness (direct or contingent) outstanding from time to
time.”

11. Section 4.04 o f the Loan Agreement o f October 1, 1997 has identical language.

12. Section 5.04 o f the Loan Agreement of July 27, 1990 has a materially identical
pari passu clause.

13. Section 5.01(d) of the Loan Agreement of January 21,2000 also has a materially
identical pari passu clause.

14. The Loan Agreements also contain (see, e.g., Section 5.02 o f the April 24,1997
Loan Agreement (and similar provisions in the other Loan Agreements)) a negative covenant
that precludes Grenada, until Ex-Im Bank is paid in full, from permitting any obligation “to have
any priority or be subject to any preferential arrangement, whether or not constituting a security
agreement, in favor o f any creditor or class o f creditors, as to security, the repayment o f
principal and interest or the right to receive income or revenue.” (Emphasis added).

15. The Loan Agreements each define “External Indebtedness” as debt denominated
in a currency other than Grenada’s and payable to a nonresident of Grenada.

16According to their plain language, the pari passu clauses preclude Grenada from
making a payment to a holder of External Indebtedness without making a ratable payment at the
same time to Ex-Im Bank.

3

17. In 2005, Grenada made an offer to restructure its commercial debt, which most of
Grenada’s eligible external debtholders accepted.

18. According to its Offering Memorandum, Grenada’s debt restructuring involved an
exchange o f defaulted bonds—processed through J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“JPM”) in
New York, acting as Exchange Agent—for a series o f new bonds denominated in United States
dollars, governed by New York law, and issued pursuant to an indenture with JPM, as indenture
trustee.

19. In Grenada’s Offering Memorandum for that exchange, it stated plainly that
Grenada did not intend to pay any debt that elected not to restructure unless resources became
available to do so. In addition, Grenada stated that it did not intend to pay any amount in respect
of any debt that elected not to restructure if, at the time such payment is due, a payment default
then existed under any new bond issued in the exchange.

20. Ex-Im Bank did not participate in the restructuring.

21. Upon information and belief, Grenada also received debt relief from the Paris
Club in 2006, resulting in the rescheduling of its obligations to bilateral creditors including
Belgium, the United Kingdom, the United States, and France.

22. Upon information and belief, in connection with the 2005 and the Paris Club
restructurings, Grenada has been making substantial interest payments on its external debt for
years, to the tune of over $43,000,000 (approximately $8,242,000 in 2008, $11,429,000 in 2009,
$11,478,000 in 2010, and $12,443,000 in 2011).

4

23As recently as October 15,2012, Grenada paid a full interest payment to the
holders of a $193,000,000 bond arising from the 2005 debt restructuring.

24. At least a portion of these payments are being made through Grenada’s paying
agent, the Bank of New York Mellon (global headquarters at One Wall Street, New York, NY).

25. In a prospectus for the refinancing of Grenada treasury bills in November 2012,
Grenada (1) claimed that it “has witnessed a remarkable recovery” since Hurricanes Ivan and
Emily in 2004 and 2005; (2) highlighted its 2005 commercial debt restructuring, the debt relief it
received from the Paris Club, its years-long participation in IMF economic reform programs, and
its establishment of a Debt Management Unit within its Ministry of Finance; and (3) stated that it
“has an exemplary record” of repaying all issues of treasury bills since Grenada’s entry into that
market.

26. In the earlier action between the parties, Grenada has made many efforts to evade
responsibility for its debts to Ex-Im Bank.

27Ex-Im Bank has been damaged as a result of Grenada’s violations o f the pari
passu clauses and will continue to be damaged by the ongoing violations.

CLAIM FOR SPECIFIC ENFORCEMENT OF THE PARI PASSU CLAUSES AND THE
NEGATIVE COVENANT FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

28. Ex-Im Bank repeats and re-alleges the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1
through 25 herein.

29. Pursuant to the pari passu clauses of the Loan Agreements, Grenada guaranteed
that, “Borrower’s obligations under this Agreement and the Note will at all times rank at least

5

pari passu with Borrower’s any other External Indebtedness (direct or contingent) outstanding
from time to time.”

30. Grenada, therefore, may not make any payment of its External Indebtedness
without also making a ratable payment at the same time to Ex-Im Bank.

31. Pursuant to the negative covenant, described in paragraph 14 above, Grenada
promised not to enter into any “preferential arrangement” with any “class o f creditors” as to “the
repayment of principal and interest.”

32. Grenada, therefore, may not enter into any agreement other creditors under which
it prefers those creditors as to the payment of principal and interest above its obligation to pay
Ex-Im Bank.

33. Grenada’s past payments to holders of its other External Indebtedness, while
paying nothing to Ex-Im Bank, violated the pari passu clauses and its negative covenant not to
prefer other creditors over Ex-Im Bank with respect to the repayment o f principal and interest.

34. Grenada’s continuing payments to holders of its other External Indebtedness,
without making any payments to Ex-Im Bank, will be ongoing violations o f the pari passu
clauses and its negative covenant against granting preferences in payment to other creditors.

35. Ex-Im Bank has suffered irreparable injury from Grenada’s violation of the pari
passu clauses and will continue to suffer such injury unless the Court specifically enforces the
clauses with a mandatory injunction requiring Grenada to pay Ex-Im Bank ratably whenever it
makes payments on its other External Indebtedness.

6

36. Remedies available at law are inadequate to compensate for such injury.

37. Ex-Im Bank has performed its part of the Loan Agreements with Grenada.

38. The balance of equities tips overwhelmingly toward the issuance o f an injunction.

39. The public interest would not be harmed by the issuance of a permanent
injunction.
WHEREFORE, Ex-Im Bank demands judgment against Grenada (1) specifically
enforcing the pari passu clauses and the negative covenant against granting preferential payment
arrangements to other creditors, and (2) awarding Ex-Im Bank its costs, prejudgment interest,
attorneys’ fees and such other and further relief as the Court shall deem just and proper.
Dated: New York, New York SULLIVAN & WORCESTER LLP

March 4,2013
Paul E. Summit
Andrew T. Solomon
1633 Broadway
New York, NY 10019
T. 212.660.3000
F. 212.660.3001
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Judgment Creditor The Export-
Import Bank o f the Republic o f China
7

hier gehts Grenada pari passu mässig an den Kragen....


hier gehts Grenada pari passu mässig an den Kragen....


hier gehts Grenada pari passu mässig an den Kragen....


PLAINTIFF(S) ADDRESS(ES) AND COUNTY(IES)
The Export-Import Bank of the Republic of China
3 Nanhai Road, 8th Floor
Taipei (100) Taiwan
Republic of China

DEFENDANT(S) ADDRESS(ES) AND COUNTY(IES)
Grenada
Ministry of Finance
Financial Complex
Carenage, St. George's, Grenada


Paul E. Summit
Andrew T. Solomon
SULLIVAN & WORCESTER LLP
1633 Broadway
New York, NY 10019
(212)660-3000
Attorneys fo r Plaintiff/Judgment Creditor

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
THE EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF
THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA,
-X
Plaintiff/Judgment Creditor,
-against-
GRENADA,
Defendant/Judgment Debtor.
-X
i l
Civil Action No:
COMPLAINT
Ca í
•'C
I
Plaintiff The Export-Import Bank of the Republic of China (“Ex-Im Bank”), by its-*7"

attorneys, Sullivan & Worcester LLP, complains of the defendant Grenada as follows^
• ••

JURISDICTION AND VENUE o '

I. This court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action pursuant to 28
U.S.C.§ 1330.

2. Venue properly exists in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(f), based upon
the residence and status o f the parties, the events and omissions giving rise to the claims, and the
agreement which provides the basis for this action.

3. In addition, Grenada irrevocably consented to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of
any State or Federal Court in New York, New York, to waive any objection to that venue on any
ground, and to accept service o f process by registered or certified mail to the notice address
provided in the agreements at issue.

THE PARTIES

4. Ex-Im Bank is a banking institution organized and existing under the laws of the
Republic of China, with its principal place o f business in Taipei, the Republic of China. The
business of Ex-Im Bank includes the lending of money internationally.

5. Grenada is a foreign state as defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a).

BACKGROUND

6. Between 1990 and 2000, Ex-Im Bank and Grenada executed four loan agreements
by which Grenada borrowed a total o f $28,000,000 from Ex-Im Bank (the “Loan Agreements”).

7. On March 16, 2007, in an earlier action between the parties, Civil Action No. 06-
CV-2469(HB)(AJP), this Court entered an amended judgment in favor o f Ex-Im Bank and
against Grenada in the amount o f $21,586,057.38, plus pre-judgment interest, attorney’s fees and
statutory interest in connection with Grenada’s default on four multi-million dollar promissory
notes executed by Grenada in favor o f Ex-Im Bank pursuant to the Loan Agreements.

8. With post-judgment interest, Ex-Im Bank’s judgment against Grenada now stands
in excess of $32,000,000.

9. Almost six years later, Grenada has still not paid anything to Ex-Im Bank in
satisfaction o f the judgment.

10. Section 4.04 o f the Loan Agreement o f April 24, 1997 states, “Borrower’s
obligations under this Agreement and the Note will at all times rank at least pari passu with
Borrower’s any other External Indebtedness (direct or contingent) outstanding from time to
time.”

11. Section 4.04 o f the Loan Agreement o f October 1, 1997 has identical language.

12. Section 5.04 o f the Loan Agreement of July 27, 1990 has a materially identical
pari passu clause.

13. Section 5.01(d) of the Loan Agreement of January 21,2000 also has a materially
identical pari passu clause.

14. The Loan Agreements also contain (see, e.g., Section 5.02 o f the April 24,1997
Loan Agreement (and similar provisions in the other Loan Agreements)) a negative covenant
that precludes Grenada, until Ex-Im Bank is paid in full, from permitting any obligation “to have
any priority or be subject to any preferential arrangement, whether or not constituting a security
agreement, in favor o f any creditor or class o f creditors, as to security, the repayment o f
principal and interest or the right to receive income or revenue.” (Emphasis added).

15. The Loan Agreements each define “External Indebtedness” as debt denominated
in a currency other than Grenada’s and payable to a nonresident of Grenada.

16According to their plain language, the pari passu clauses preclude Grenada from
making a payment to a holder of External Indebtedness without making a ratable payment at the
same time to Ex-Im Bank.

3

17. In 2005, Grenada made an offer to restructure its commercial debt, which most of
Grenada’s eligible external debtholders accepted.

18. According to its Offering Memorandum, Grenada’s debt restructuring involved an
exchange o f defaulted bonds—processed through J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“JPM”) in
New York, acting as Exchange Agent—for a series o f new bonds denominated in United States
dollars, governed by New York law, and issued pursuant to an indenture with JPM, as indenture
trustee.

19. In Grenada’s Offering Memorandum for that exchange, it stated plainly that
Grenada did not intend to pay any debt that elected not to restructure unless resources became
available to do so. In addition, Grenada stated that it did not intend to pay any amount in respect
of any debt that elected not to restructure if, at the time such payment is due, a payment default
then existed under any new bond issued in the exchange.

20. Ex-Im Bank did not participate in the restructuring.

21. Upon information and belief, Grenada also received debt relief from the Paris
Club in 2006, resulting in the rescheduling of its obligations to bilateral creditors including
Belgium, the United Kingdom, the United States, and France.

22. Upon information and belief, in connection with the 2005 and the Paris Club
restructurings, Grenada has been making substantial interest payments on its external debt for
years, to the tune of over $43,000,000 (approximately $8,242,000 in 2008, $11,429,000 in 2009,
$11,478,000 in 2010, and $12,443,000 in 2011).

4

23As recently as October 15,2012, Grenada paid a full interest payment to the
holders of a $193,000,000 bond arising from the 2005 debt restructuring.

24. At least a portion of these payments are being made through Grenada’s paying
agent, the Bank of New York Mellon (global headquarters at One Wall Street, New York, NY).

25. In a prospectus for the refinancing of Grenada treasury bills in November 2012,
Grenada (1) claimed that it “has witnessed a remarkable recovery” since Hurricanes Ivan and
Emily in 2004 and 2005; (2) highlighted its 2005 commercial debt restructuring, the debt relief it
received from the Paris Club, its years-long participation in IMF economic reform programs, and
its establishment of a Debt Management Unit within its Ministry of Finance; and (3) stated that it
“has an exemplary record” of repaying all issues of treasury bills since Grenada’s entry into that
market.

26. In the earlier action between the parties, Grenada has made many efforts to evade
responsibility for its debts to Ex-Im Bank.

27Ex-Im Bank has been damaged as a result of Grenada’s violations o f the pari
passu clauses and will continue to be damaged by the ongoing violations.

CLAIM FOR SPECIFIC ENFORCEMENT OF THE PARI PASSU CLAUSES AND THE
NEGATIVE COVENANT FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

28. Ex-Im Bank repeats and re-alleges the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1
through 25 herein.

29. Pursuant to the pari passu clauses of the Loan Agreements, Grenada guaranteed
that, “Borrower’s obligations under this Agreement and the Note will at all times rank at least

5

pari passu with Borrower’s any other External Indebtedness (direct or contingent) outstanding
from time to time.”

30. Grenada, therefore, may not make any payment of its External Indebtedness
without also making a ratable payment at the same time to Ex-Im Bank.

31. Pursuant to the negative covenant, described in paragraph 14 above, Grenada
promised not to enter into any “preferential arrangement” with any “class o f creditors” as to “the
repayment of principal and interest.”

32. Grenada, therefore, may not enter into any agreement other creditors under which
it prefers those creditors as to the payment of principal and interest above its obligation to pay
Ex-Im Bank.

33. Grenada’s past payments to holders of its other External Indebtedness, while
paying nothing to Ex-Im Bank, violated the pari passu clauses and its negative covenant not to
prefer other creditors over Ex-Im Bank with respect to the repayment o f principal and interest.

34. Grenada’s continuing payments to holders of its other External Indebtedness,
without making any payments to Ex-Im Bank, will be ongoing violations o f the pari passu
clauses and its negative covenant against granting preferences in payment to other creditors.

35. Ex-Im Bank has suffered irreparable injury from Grenada’s violation of the pari
passu clauses and will continue to suffer such injury unless the Court specifically enforces the
clauses with a mandatory injunction requiring Grenada to pay Ex-Im Bank ratably whenever it
makes payments on its other External Indebtedness.

6

36. Remedies available at law are inadequate to compensate for such injury.

37. Ex-Im Bank has performed its part of the Loan Agreements with Grenada.

38. The balance of equities tips overwhelmingly toward the issuance o f an injunction.

39. The public interest would not be harmed by the issuance of a permanent
injunction.
WHEREFORE, Ex-Im Bank demands judgment against Grenada (1) specifically
enforcing the pari passu clauses and the negative covenant against granting preferential payment
arrangements to other creditors, and (2) awarding Ex-Im Bank its costs, prejudgment interest,
attorneys’ fees and such other and further relief as the Court shall deem just and proper.
Dated: New York, New York SULLIVAN & WORCESTER LLP

March 4,2013
Paul E. Summit
Andrew T. Solomon
1633 Broadway
New York, NY 10019
T. 212.660.3000
F. 212.660.3001
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Judgment Creditor The Export-
Import Bank o f the Republic o f China
7

Mittwoch, 6. März 2013

Pari passu, the cross-sovereign contamination // Some excerpts from a lawsuit filed by the Export-Import Bank of China (Taipei) against Grenada in a United States district court on March 4, 2013…


Pari passu, the cross-sovereign contamination // Some excerpts from a lawsuit filed by the Export-Import Bank of China (Taipei) against Grenada in a United States district court on March 4, 2013…


Pari passu, the cross-sovereign contamination

Some excerpts from a lawsuit filed by the Export-Import Bank of China (Taipei) against Grenada in a United States district court on March 4, 2013…
If you have been following the pari passu saga on ratable payment of sovereign debt — they tell their own story. (Click to enlarge all images.)
1.) Ex-Im Bank already has a judgement on $32m of debt defaulted on by Grenada.
2.) The loan debt had a pari passu clause, and negative pledge language.
3.) Let’s just spell that last bit out, as cited by Ex-Im Bank.
According to their plain language, the pari passu clauses preclude Grenada from making a ratable payment to a holder of External Indebtedness without making a ratable payment at the same time to Ex-Im Bank.
4.) Ex-Im Bank stayed out of Grenada’s 2005 debt restructuring.
5.) It has been watching Grenada pay the people who did restructure.
6.) Bank of New York handled some of that dough. Bank of New York lives in New York.
7.) Ex-Im Bank is now coming after these payments to Grenada’s restructured bondholders. (Hello, intercreditor consequences of ratable payment.)
8.) And Ex-Im Bank’s citing equity.
They didn’t even wait for a final Second Circuit ruling on Argentina making ratable payments to its holdouts. (Why should they, actually? The implications of ratable payment are arguably clear.)
Incidentally observe point 1) there, that Ex-Im Bank is exploring this avenue having already won judgement against Grenada. (The story of their dispute is a long one.)
The $1.3bn of claims involved in NML’s pari passu litigation against Argentina were not judgement debts. Nevertheless. EM Ltd, which holds a prior judgement against Argentina, said (in a pro-holdout amicus brief) that while “the District Court has not yet been asked to address whether the Equal Treatment Provision can be used to enforce an existing judgment,” EM Ltd “believes that the Equal Treatment Provision applies with identical force in the post-judgment context”.
And now we have crossed into new territory.

Sonntag, 3. März 2013

einiges was wir schon immer über pari passu wissen wolten....


einiges was wir schon immer über pari passu wissen wolten....


All of this has happened before and will happen again, sovereign pari passu edition

On October 26, the Second Circuit chucked out Argentina’s appeal against having to pay bond holdouts, having had “little difficulty concluding” that the defaulted debt’s dusty, old — but contractually standard — pari passu clause demanded rateable payment.
From that day forth, the world of restructuring sovereign debt – and writing sovereign debt contracts – was shaken. Maybe even changed forever. Certainly for the New York law part of that world, if not so much (or not yet) English law.
At the very least this might be considered an opportune moment to tweak the boilerplate sovereign pari passu clause. It is after all famously ambiguoushistorically obscure, and the version at fault in the Second Circuit ruling is not a cross uniquely borne by the Republic of Argentina.
Chart via CreditSlips:
Well, who told these sovereigns…
Ivory Coast (November 30 reopening of 2032 bonds, governed by New York law):
The Securities are unsecured. The Securities constitute direct, general, unconditional and unsecured and unsubordinated obligations of the Republic ranking pari passu, without any preference among themselves with all other outstanding, unsecured and unsubordinated obligations, present and future, of the Republic.
Serbia (November 19 issue of 2017 bonds, governed by English law):
The Notes will constitute direct, unconditional and (subject to the provisions of a negative pledge covenant described below) unsecured obligations of the Issuer. The Notes rank and will rank pari passu among themselves and at least pari passu in right of payment with all other present and future unsecured obligations of the Issuer, save only for such obligations as may be preferred by mandatory provisions of applicable law. The full faith and credit of the Issuer is pledged to the due and punctual payment of all amounts due in respect of the Notes.
Mongolia (November 21 medium-term note programme, New York law):
The Notes and any relative Receipts and Coupons are direct, unconditional, unsubordinated and (subject to the provisions of Condition 4) unsecured obligations of the Issuer and rank and will rank pari passu, without preference among themselves, with all other unsecured and unsubordinated External Indebtedness (as defined in Condition 10) of the Issuer, from time to time outstanding.
Costa Rica (November 16 issue of 2023 bonds, New York law):
The Notes will constitute general, direct, unconditional and unsecured Public External Indebtedness of the Republic and will rank pari passu in right of payment, without any preference among themselves, with all unsecured and unsubordinated obligations of the Republic, present and future, relating to Public External Indebtedness of the Republic. The Republic has pledged its full faith and credit for the due and punctual payment of all amounts due in respect of the Notes.
Ukraine (November 26 issue of 2022 bonds, English law):
The Notes constitute direct, unconditional and, subject to the provisions of Condition 3 (Negative Pledge), unsecured obligations of the Issuer and (subject as aforesaid) rank pari passu without any preference among themselves. The payment obligations of the Issuer under the Notes shall rank at least pari passu with all other unsecured and unsubordinated obligations of the Issuer, present and future, save only for such obligations as may be preferred by mandatory provisions of applicable law.
Argentina (1994 Fiscal Agency Agreement, the “FAA bonds”, New York law):
The Securities will constitute (except as provided in Section 11 below) direct, unconditional, unsecured and unsubordinated obligations of the Republic and shall at all times rank pari passu and without any preference among themselves. The payment obligations of the Republic under the Securities shall at all times rank at least equally with all its other present and future unsecured and unsubordinated External Indebtedness (as defined in this Agreement).
Spot the differences.
That’s a selection of pari passu clauses in prospectuses for sovereign debt issued in the six weeks or so since the Second Circuit ruling. Plus, for reference, the clause in the original Argentine holdout debt.
We’re grateful to Mitu Gulati, law professor at Duke University, for gathering together these new bond issues. Gulati also makes a very interesting point: these clauses do not show sudden change. They are not markedly different to ones used before the Argentina litigation exploded on to the front pages.
What’s more, a few governments have even recycled the very ‘payments’ language which got Argentina into so much hot water with the Second Circuit. (Others’ clauses stick to somewhat blander – safer? – ‘ranking’ language, which could support a view that the clauses only promise equal legal ranking of creditors.)
In a ruling which every sovereign debt lawyer in the business would have carefully noted, the Second Circuit decided that the second, “payment obligations” sentence of the Argentine clause “prohibits Argentina, as bond payor, from paying on other bonds without paying on the FAA Bonds.” That is a challenge to the reigning “equal ranking” interpretation, and a potentially fatal chink in a defaulting sovereign’s armour. And it’s back in bond issues as if nothing had happened.
That’s pretty extraordinary.
But the real question is where this overall inertia in pari passu language is coming from. A bit like the pari passu clause itself, it is kind of a mystery. Or is it?
Maybe the sovereigns don’t want change.
Maybe they just like the way things have been done and drafted before, or dislike being associated with novelty. Ivory Coast was reopening an old bond, for example, while Mongolia and Costa Rica aren’t names you see in the market every day. Similarly, if those pari passu clauses bearing ‘ranking’-heavy wording aren’t obviously broke, why fix them? Holdout nastygrams featuring the pari passu clause might in general be seen as an abundantly acceptable risk, far off in the tail, for Mr or Ms Harassed Finance Minister. A government would have to blow up the economy and try to restructure its debt first. A tail risk all to itself.
Maybe the sovereigns therefore think they’re safe enough. When it comes to bearing holdout risk, it is worth noting that one or two of the sovereigns here who have issued with ‘payments’ pari passu language did so under English law and the exclusive jurisdiction of English courts.
There’s some speculation that an English judge would laugh a payment interpretation of pari passu right out of court. Informed speculation, based on these 2005 ruminations by the Financial Markets Law Committee. (The FMLC quite literally said English contract interpretation is far too common sense to tolerate silliness like this.) But then it remains only speculation: there has been no decisive English court ruling that turned on the meaning of pari passu. English courts sometimes throw up left-field judgements in debt restructuring. Meanwhile, what’s now being said about English courts used to be said about New York courts after a Belgian judge rewarded holdouts in Elliott v Peru at the turn of the century. Couldn’t happen here, until it happened.
Maybe the sovereigns trust in collective action clauses to preempt any holdout challenge, and thus pari passu dispute. There’s a number of the clauses dotted across these bonds’ terms. But then CACs aren’t holdout-proof.
Maybe the markets don’t want change. Investors took down Costa Rica’s bond in return for the country’s lowest ever borrowing cost. It is one of the bonds here which feature the ‘payment’ version of pari passu. Elliott and other holdouts would probably love to point to this kind of thing, as it would appear to show there’s no wider systemic problem with the way they want to get their money from Argentina.
But then we’re assuming sovereigns and markets are the main agents driving any change in pari passu wording. We’re not looking at the drafters themselves: law firms. They are the ones who have previously treated the clause as boilerplate, including it cookie-cutter-fashion across bond contracts despite – apparently – not really knowing where it comes from, how it got into sovereign debt, or what it means.
There is a curious (and slightly scary) hint here about how big law drafts financial contracts, which is pretty interesting beyond the pari passu saga. In fact, Mitu Gulati went and wrote an entire book on it with Robert Scott of Columbia law school. More on that, in a later post.
Related link:
Argentina’s (not so) unusual pari passu clause – Credit Slips